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PROTESTANT PERSPECTIVES
ON INFORMED CONSENT
(PARTICULARLY IN RESEARCH
INVOLVING HUMAN PARTICIPANTS)
James F. Childress*
INTRODUCTION
It is virtually impossible to state the Protestant position on any
bioethical problem or issue. As a result, interpreters must focus on
one Protestant position or, at most, identify a few Protestant posi-
tions with respect to a particular bioethical problem. Thus, in ad-
dressing my assigned topic, I will focus on selected Protestant
perspectives on informed consent/refusal, particularly in the con-
text of research involving human subjects or participants.
Several factors contribute to this limitation, not the least of
which is that a couple of hundred denominations in the United
States march under the banner of Protestantism. Even if we start
with the major Reformation traditions, we discover *that the Lu-
theran and Calvinist (Reformed) traditions have splintered,2 and
that the so-called "radical" Reformation, or "left-wing" of the Ref-
ormation, encompasses numerous other groups, including the
Anabaptists, a label that also covers different denominations.
An attempt to discern a broad Protestant tradition, in contrast to
traditions, would necessarily operate at a very high and largely un-
informative level of generality. For example, Paul Tillich identified
what he called "the Protestant principle," which represents "the
divine and human protest against any absolute claim made for a
relative reality, even if this claim is made by a Protestant church."4
For Tillich, this principle is "the theological expression of the true
relation between the unconditional and the conditioned or, relig-
* Hollingsworth Professor of Ethics, Director, Institute for Practical Ethics, Uni-
versity of Virginia.
1. WORLD CHRISTIAN ENCYCLOPEDIA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CHURCHES
AND RELIGION IN THE MODERN WORLD A.D., 1900-2000, at 714-15 (David B. Barrett
et al. eds., 1982).
2. JOHN T. McNEILL, THE HISTORY AND CHARACTER OF CALVINISM 4 (Oxford
Univ. Press 1967) (1954).
3. Id. at 42-25; GEORGE HUNSTON WILLIAMS, THE RADICAL REFORMATION (3d
ed., Truman State Univ. Press 2000).
4. PAUL TILLICH, THE PROTESTANT ERA 163 (James Luther Adams trans., 1948).
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iously speaking, between God and man."'5 It is "the guardian
against the attempts of the finite and conditioned to usurp the
place of the unconditional in thinking and acting."' 6 However im-
portant this principle is, it provides little guidance about Protestant
beliefs and practices, including bioethics.
Yet another limitation is also worth noting. The assigned topic
of informed consent, with particular attention to research involving
human subjects or participants, has not received extensive treat-
ment in Protestant denominational statements and guidance. To
illustrate, I will draw examples from the valuable Park Ridge
Center series on different religious traditions' beliefs and practices
regarding health care.
The document on the Lutheran tradition notes that "consistent
with their general respect for medicine and informed decision mak-
ing, [Lutherans] are likely to favor self-determination and in-
formed consent."'7 The document on the Presbyterian tradition
(out of the Calvinist or Reformed tradition) notes that, because of
the emphasis on freedom of conscience, Presbyterians would em-
phasize free exchange of information by patient and caregiver and
would tend to err on the side of patient autonomy rather than
caregiver paternalism. Turning to research involving human sub-
jects, the document notes that the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.)
"generally supports self-determination and informed consent in
medical procedures and experimentation. The General Assembly
advocates that 'human subjects be given the strongest human pro-
tections, including full information about the research, and that
their consent be obtained without coercion.""
The Park Ridge Center report on Anabaptist beliefs and prac-
tices-including the Mennonites and Amish-notes that no official
positions were found on therapeutic or nontherapeutic medical ex-
perimentation on various populations or on self-determination and
informed consent, but, the report continues, the Anabaptist tradi-
tion's theological-ethical beliefs, such as God's creation of persons
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. THE LUTHERAN TRADITION: RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND HEALTH CARE DECI-
SIONS 3 (Deborah Harris-Abbott ed., The Park Ridge Ctr. for the Study of Health,
Faith, & Ethics 1996).
8. THE PRESBYTERIAN TRADITION: RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND HEALTH CARE DE-
CISIONS 3 (Deborah Harris-Abbott ed., The Park Ridge Ctr. for the Study of Health,
Faith, & Ethics 1996).
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in his own image and noncoercion in religious matters, tend to sup-
port self-determination and informed consent in such settings.9
The report on the United Methodist tradition stresses that, for
Methodists, personal autonomy and self-determination are highly
valued because God has created human beings in his own image.10
"The right of persons to accept or reject treatment is protected in a
just society by norms and procedures that involve the patient as an
active participant in medical decisions . . . ." Informed consent
requires disclosure to the patient of all information that a reasona-
ble person would find useful in similar circumstances. This infor-
mation would include the proposed treatment's benefits, harms,
and risks, as well as alternatives. This report notes that in medical
experimentation and research, which are considered important, "it
is imperative that governments and the medical profession enforce
prevailing medical research requirements, standards, and controls
in testing new technologies and drugs on human subjects. The
standard requires that those engaged in research shall use human
beings as research subjects only after obtaining full, rational, and
uncoerced consent. 12
These last comments suggest one explanation for the relative
dearth of official Protestant statements on and guidance about our
topic. There exists an affinity between several Protestant beliefs
and practices on the one hand, and requirements of voluntary, in-
formed consent (or refusal) in medicine, health care, and research
involving human participants, on the other. Indeed, there is often
a convergence or overlap of Protestant religious norms and secular
standards of informed consent. This convergence or overlap may
result, in part, from historical Protestant influences on social life,
including medicine. Sociologists of religion and others have often
noted the affinity between major beliefs and practices in Protes-
tantism and individualism, 3 which, when fleshed out, can support
voluntary informed consent. As I will stress later, some Protestant
beliefs and practices that have supported individualism may have
9. See THE ANABAPTIST TRADITION: RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND HEALTH CARE
DECISIONS 2-3 (Ronald P. Hamel ed., The Park Ridge Ctr. for the Study of Health,
Faith, & Ethics 1996).
10. THE UNITED METHODIST TRADITION: RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND HEALTH
CARE DECISIONS 2 (Edwin R. Dubose ed., The Park Ridge Ctr. for the Study of
Health, Faith, & Ethics 1995).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 5.
13. See, e.g., MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITAL-
ISM 105-06, 222 n.22 (Talcott Parsons trans., Charles Scribner's Sons 1958).
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left deposits of norms of conduct that now function independently
of their religious origins. Indeed, one interpretation of the process
of secularization is that it institutionalizes, in the broader society,
values that originated in particular religious traditions-for in-
stance, Talcott Parsons argued that certain Christian values, such as
equality, were embedded in the social fabric. 4
As a result of this historical process, Protestant religious tradi-
tions may have little that is materially distinctive to contribute to
discussions of voluntary, informed consent. The National Bioethics
Advisory Commission ("NBAC"), on which I served from its be-
ginning until its demise from passive euthanasia (non-renewal of its
charter) in October 2001, invited scholars of and within particular
religious traditions to present testimony on human reproductive
cloning and on human embryonic stem cell research. There was
great variety on these topics across and within different religious
traditions. However, when it prepared its reports on research in-
volving human subjects, NBAC did not specifically invite religious
testimony-though, of course, all of NBAC's meetings were open,
and anyone could present testimony during the public comment
period, from any standpoint, religious or otherwise, and could sub-
mit written testimony any time. Nevertheless, I recall no specifi-
cally religious views presented to NBAC while it prepared its
report and recommendations on Research Involving Persons with
Mental Disorders That May Affect Decisionmaking Capacity.15
I. SELECTED PROTESTANT BELIEFS
Which Protestant beliefs lend support to standards of self-deter-
mination (autonomy) and voluntary, informed consent/refusal in
clinical care and research? Methodologically, Protestants have
tended to downplay tradition in favor of direct appeals to scripture,
and they have found in, or developed from, scripture several key
themes. One major theme from scripture is God's sovereignty,
which Protestants state in a variety of ways.
A second broad theme that Protestants, especially Calvinists,
emphasize is that of covenant as represented, for instance, in the
14. Talcott Parsons, Christianity and Modern Industrial Society, in SECULARIZA-
TION AND THE PROTESTANT PROSPECT 43, 43 (James F. Childress & David B. Harned
eds., 1970).
15. NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN RE-
SEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN PARTICIPANTS, VOL. I, REPORT AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS, at http://www.georgetown.edu/research/nrcbl/nbac/capacity/TOC.htm (Dec.
1998).
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sovereign God's covenant with humanity following the flood, with
Israel, and in Christ. Sometimes covenant is used as a general cate-
gory for various relationships with God as creator, provider or or-
derer, and redeemer, and with other creatures who also image
God.16 One of the most influential Protestant works in modern
medical ethics, Paul Ramsey's The Patient as Person, which will re-
ceive more 'attention below, presents covenant faithfulness as the
primary category for understanding medicine and its responsibili-
ties in light of the Christian faith. Human covenants, such as
medicine, can mirror and reflect God's covenants, and such cove-
nants share several features: they are rooted in events or actions;
engender moral community; endure over time; and in contrast to
contracts, cannot be completely specified.18 Those covenants, as
David Smith notes about Paul Ramsey's thought, follow a "princi-
ple of replication ... as God has committed himself to us, so ought
we to commit ourselves to each other. The God-human relation-
ship establishes a standard or norm for person-to-person
relationships. "19
Third, God's covenantal action begins with his creation of
human beings in his own image, and this conviction has profound
implications throughout bioethics. According to the biblical
account:
Then God said, 'Let us make man in our image, after our like-
ness; and let them have dominion ....' So God created man in
his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and
female he created them. And God blessed them, and God said
to them, 'Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue
it; and have dominion over .. .every living thing that moves
upon the earth.'2 °
Interpretations of the image of God usually focus on what is dis-
tinctive about persons, particularly their use of reason, exercise of
will, making decisions, and the like. Thus, the image of God has
been viewed as a theological basis for respect for persons. How-
ever, it would be a mistake to construe the image of God as
16. HESSEL BOUMA III ET AL., CHRISTIAN FAITH, HEALTH, AND MEDICAL PRAC-
TICE 83 (1989).
17. PAUL RAMSEY, THE PATIENT AS PERSON Xiii (1970) [hereinafter RAMSEY, PA-
TIENT AS PERSON].
18. See BOUMA ET AL., supra note 16, at 85-86.
19. David H. Smith, On Paul Ramsey: A Covenant-Centered Ethic for Medicine, in
THEOLOGICAL VOICES IN MEDICAL ETHICS 7, 8 (Allen Verhey & Stephen E. Lam-
mers eds., 1993).
20. Genesis 1:26-28; see also Genesis 5:1, 9:6; 1 Corinthians 11:7; James 3:9.
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equivalent to autonomy in the modern liberal tradition. While re-
spect for persons is one way to state the implications of the theo-
logical doctrine of the imago dei, in mainstream Protestantism, it
entails respect for embodied persons-animated body or embodied
soul or spirit-not simply their wills, and respect for persons in re-
lation, rather than as atomistic units (even though Protestant be-
liefs and practices-for example, the stress on individual
conscience-have often been taken to support individualism).
Furthermore, the principle of respect for persons, as an implica-
tion of the imago dei, does not imply unlimited self-determination
(autonomy) because autonomy is severely limited by God's crea-
tion and will (heteronomy or theonomy). Individuals do not own
their bodies or have unlimited dispositional authority over them.
Instead, divine ownership and dispositional authority set the con-
text for human trusteeship or stewardship. As Genesis 1:26 indi-
cates, scriptural directions for agents to image or to obey God also
include human dominion, which is best understood as trusteeship
or stewardship rather than unlimited control.
Fourth, human agents, created in God's image, have both nega-
tive and positive obligations. One negative obligation is to refrain
from killing themselves or others who are also created in God's
image. This obligation is stated not only in the Decalogue ("Thou
shalt not kill"), but also in the covenant with Noah after the flood:
"Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed;
for God made man in his own image. '21 Creation in God's image
also implies positive obligations. Both the Hebrew Bible/Old Tes-
tament and the New Testament stress the positive obligation of
neighbor-love, which, in various writings, Ramsey interprets as
covenant "faithfulness. " 22
Finally, Protestant convictions about the extent and depth of
human sinfulness often play a significant role in recommendations
about ways to design and structure institutions, practices, and poli-
cies, particularly where some people are especially vulnerable, as in
research involving human subjects.
These broad theological convictions often require an ethical
bridgework in order to establish explicit connections with practical
ethical judgments. For some Protestants, the ethical bridgework
can be found in "middle axioms," that is, intermediate moral prin-
ciples that fall between these broad theological-ethical convictions,
21. Genesis 9:6 (Revised Standard).
22. See Leviticus 19:18; Luke 10:27-28; see, e.g., PAUL RAMSEY, NINE MODERN
MORALISTS 235 (1982).
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such as the principle of neighbor-love, on the one hand, and partic-
ular moral judgments about acts, practices, and policies, on the
other hand. Some of these middle axioms focus on ends and conse-
quences of actions, while others focus on the intrinsic or inherent
features of actions that tend to make them right or wrong. Exam-
ples include a principle of respect for persons (and their autono-
mous choices) and a rule of voluntary, informed consent/refusal.
II. PAUL RAMSEY'S PROTESTANT PERSPECTIVE
A. Ramsey's Theological-Ethical Framework
The late Paul Ramsey was one of the most important Protestant
voices in medical ethics, research ethics, and, more generally,
bioethics. Given the diversity of Protestantism, he was not and
could not be referred to as "representative" of the views of Protes-
tantism as a whole. He waged legendary battles with other Protes-
tants, such as Joseph Fletcher, who over time moved more and
more toward a non-religious ethic. Several of these battles focused
on bioethics. Ramsey was a Methodist, who was deeply influenced
by other Protestant traditions (for example, the Calvinist Karl
Barth), by Roman Catholics (he was sometimes called the "Protes-
tant Jesuit"), and by Judaism (he found deep wisdom about em-
bodiment in the Jewish tradition).2 3 Ramsey did not develop the
theological foundations for ethics as thoroughly as many thought
he should have-some even charge that most of the theology in his
influential book, The Patient as Person, appears in the brief pref-
ace, which sketches his convenantal perspective. 24
In The Patient as Person and elsewhere, Ramsey recognized sev-
eral middle axioms (though he generally eschewed this terminol-
ogy), particularly in the form of principles or rules that serve as
deontological constraints. For reasons that will be clearer later,
he attended less to the consequences of actions and practices.
Ramsey tended to lump various deontological norms under cove-
nant responsibilities. Writing specifically about the practice of
medicine as a covenant, he noted:
Justice, fairness, righteousness, faithfulness, canons of loyalty, the
sanctity of life, hesed, agape or charity are some of the names
23. See PAUL RAMSEY, ETHICS AT THE EDGES OF LIFE: MEDICAL AND LEGAL
INTERSECTIONS xiii-xiv (1970) [hereinafter RAMSEY, ETHICS AT THE EDGES OF LIFE];
RAMSEY, PATIENT AS PERSON, supra note 17, at 154-57, 185-88.
24. See RAMSEY, PATIENT AS PERSON, supra note 17, at xi-xxii; see also supra text
accompanying note 17.
25. See RAMSEY, PATIENT AS PERSON, supra note 17, at xii-xviii.
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given to the moral quality of attitude and of action owed to all
men by any man who steps into a covenant with another man -
by any man who, so far as he is a religious man, explicitly ac-
knowledges that we are a covenant people on a common
pilgrimage.26
Ramsey does not spell out in detail the connection between the
divine covenant and human covenants, but it involves what David
Smith calls, as previously noted, a "principle of replication."27
Ramsey's views reflect a claim about secularization that was
noted above: secularization, in part, is the social institutionalization
of religious beliefs and practices, with the result that there are his-
torical deposits of religious-ethical norms in the broader society
and culture. As a consequence, believers and non-believers alike
can appeal to those norms. For instance, Ramsey wrote:
[T]he Judeo-Christian tradition decisively influenced the origin
and shape of medical ethics down to our own times. Unless an
author absurdly proposes an entirely new ethics, he is bound to
use ethical principles derived from our past religious culture. In
short, medical ethics nearly to date is a concrete case of Chris-
tian "casuistry" - that is, it consists of the outlooks of the pre-
dominant Western religion brought down to cases and used to
determine their resolution.28
In an overstatement that makes his point effectively, Stanley
Hauerwas interprets Ramsey's position:
Medicine, at least his account of medicine, confirmed his pre-
sumption that agape was in fact instantiated in Western culture.
In effect, medicine became Ramsey's church as doctors in their
commitment to patients remained more faithful to the ethic of
Jesus than Christians who were constantly tempted to utopian
dreams fueled by utilitarian presumptions.29
Ramsey's approach to these historical deposits was largely to in-
terpret, extend, deepen, and refine them, but rarely to reject or
fundamentally revise them.
26. Id. at xii-xiii.
27. See Smith, supra note 19, at 8; see also supra text accompanying note 19.
28. RAMSEY, ETHICS AT THE EDGES OF LIFE, supra note 23, at xiv.
29. Stanley Hauerwas, How Christian Ethics Became Medical Ethics: The Case of
Paul Ramsey, in RELIGION AND MEDICAL ETHICS: LOOKING BACK, LOOKING FOR-
WARD 70, 79 (Allen Verhey ed., 1996).
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III. NEIGHBOR-LOVE AND JUSTICE IN RESEARCH INVOLVING
HUMAN SUBJECTS
In clinical relations, Ramsey recognized the limits of patient au-
tonomy, particularly in the context of decisions about death and
dying. The limits he set on patient choices about dying included
"medical indications," which dictated clinician's responses.3' Nev-
ertheless, the requirement of voluntary, informed consent-with
greater emphasis on "voluntariness" than on "information"-
figures prominently in Ramsey's discussion of research involving
human subjects.3
In The Patient as Person, Paul Ramsey offered an interpretation
of research involving human subjects in light of his fundamental
theological-ethical convictions, and he further explicated his posi-
tion in an extended debate with Richard McCormick, S.J., about
the use of children in nontherapeutic research. 32 Ramsey's views
about the use of children as unconsenting subjects extend ceteris
paribus to other unconsenting subjects.
The debate between Ramsey and McCormick focuses in part on
where to draw the line between charity and justice, and their re-
spective positions depend on several theological, metaphysical, and
anthropological convictions (which are closely connected with, but
not limited to, Ramsey's Protestant and McCormick's Roman
Catholic traditions).33 Both Ramsey and McCormick appeal to the
distinction between love (charity) and justice in order to determine
30. RAMSEY, ETHICS AT THE EDGE OF LIFE, supra note 23, at 176-77, 187-88.
31. See RAMSEY, PATIENT AS PERSON, supra note 17, at 3-11.
32. Id. at 11-19; infra note 33 and accompanying text.
33. Ramsey fired the first salvo in The Patient as Person. RAMSEY, PATIENT AS
PERSON, supra note 17, at 11-19. McCormick responded in Richard McCormick,
Proxy Consent in the Experimental Situation, 18 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED., Autumn
1974, at 2-20 [hereinafter McCormick, Proxy Consent]. This was reprinted in a
slightly different version in a Festschrift for Paul Ramsey. LOVE AND SOCIETY: Es-
SAYS IN THE ETHICS OF PAUL RAMSEY 209-27 (James T. Johnson & David H. Smith
eds., 1974). Ramsey responded in Paul Ramsey, The Enforcement of Morals: Non-
therapeutic Research on Children, 6 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Aug. 1976, at 21-30
[hereinafter Ramsey, Enforcement of Morals]. McCormick offered a reply in Richard
McCormick, Experimentation in Children: Sharing in Sociality, 6 HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Dec. 1976, at 41-46 [hereinafter McCormick, Experimentation in Children].
Ramsey's further response appeared in Paul Ramsey, Children as Research Subjects:
A Reply, 7 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Apr. 1977, at 40-42 [hereinafter Ramsey, Chil-
dren as Research Subjects]. For additional themes, see Paul Ramsey, Some Rejoin-
ders, 4 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 185, 185-237 (1976) [hereinafter Ramsey, Some
Rejoinders]; see also Richard McCormick, Experimental Subjects: Who Should They
Be?, 235 J. AM. MED. ASs'N 2197 (1976) [hereinafter McCormick, Experimental Sub-
jects]. I have developed my analysis of this debate at greater length in James F. Chil-
dress, Love and Justice in Christian Biomedical Ethics, in THEOLOGY AND BIOETHICS:
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which research, if any, may be performed on human beings without
their consent, i.e., without their expressed will or against their ex-
pressed will.34 They agree that acts of charity cannot be demanded
or enforced." Such acts can be performed only by individuals who
can act voluntarily, and the acts themselves must be voluntary.
Ramsey and McCormick also agree that some standards of justice
may be enforced even if individuals do not consent to them.36
Their different views about which research activities fall under
charity and which under justice appear on two levels: (1) the soci-
ety's pursuit of scientific and medical research, for example,
through the allocation of funds; and (2) the individual's responsi-
bility to participate in such research.37 For Ramsey, scientific and
medical research is optional from the society's standpoint, whereas,
for McCormick, such research is so important that it is imperative
for the society to pursue it.38 In contrast to McCormick, deonto-
logical considerations dominate for Ramsey. 39 By and large, ac-
cording to Ramsey, the society has moral discretion about pursuing
various goals.4n However, deontological considerations set limits
on how it may pursue those goals. Indeed, regarding society's rea-
sons for going to war or for setting its priorities, Ramsey held that
moral assessments of goals cannot be as definite or as conclusive as
the determination of moral limits on the pursuit of those goals.41
Research is often justified as part of humankind's warfare
against disease and premature death. However, Ramsey drew a
sharp distinction between warfare against disease and premature
death, on the one hand, and war against national enemies, on the
other.42 According to Ramsey's distinction, war prevents evil,
while research provides positive benefits rather than preventing
evils.43 He often characterizes research as the pursuit of "pro-
EXPLORING THE FOUNDATIONS AND FRONTIERS 225-43 (Earl E. Shelp ed., 1985),
from which I have drawn some ideas and formulations.
34. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
35. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
36. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
37. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
38. Compare Ramsey, Enforcement of Morals, supra note 33, at 26, with McCor-
mick, Experimentation in Children, supra note 33, at 43.
39. Ramsey, Children as Research Subjects, supra note 33, at 40; see Ramsey, En-
forcement of Morals, supra note 33, at 22-24.
40. Ramsey, Children as Research Subjects, supra note 33, at 41 ("We are to do all
the good we morally can, not all the good we can.").
41. RAMSEY, PATIENT AS PERSON, supra note 17, at 240.
42. See, e.g., Ramsey, Some Rejoinders, supra note 33, at 185, 229-30.
43. Id. at 230.
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gress."44 From this evaluative description of the research enter-
prise, Ramsey concludes that research is optional for both societies
and individuals.45
Ramsey's sharp distinction between war against disease and pre-
mature death and war against national enemies is problematic. In
the final analysis, it is probably a distinction between positive and
negative goals, rather than positive and negative duties. Surely the
duty to prevent evil is a positive rather than a negative duty be-
cause it requires positive actions. A common example of a nega-
tive duty is the duty of nonmaleficence, that is, the duty not to
injure or harm others.46 However, the duty to prevent such harm
or injury involves positive actions; thus, it is more plausibly located
under some other principle such as justice or beneficence, rather
than nonmaleficence. Nevertheless, within Ramsey's schema, the
duty to refrain from injuring others, and its associated duty to pre-
vent such injury are more stringent than the duty to help others
(beneficence). 47 Ramsey also believes that international war can
sometimes be construed as preventing evil, but that only research
can be construed as producing benefits. 41
It is not surprising then that Ramsey rejects proposed analogies
between conscription for research participation and conscription
for military service. 49 But one part of Ramsey's argument against
such analogies does not withstand scrutiny; that is his effort to dis-
tinguish conscripted (adult) research subjects from conscripted
soldiers. He contends that:
[C]onscripted soldiers are citizens who, though young, have
lived in a political society and shared in its safety and other ben-
efits. They have tacitly accepted the benefits of that common
good that flow back upon them as individuals, and so also argua-
bly have entered into a community of shared expectations con-
cerning the common defense.50
Similar points could plausibly be made about the conscription of
adults for participation in nontherapeutic research involving mini-
mal risk, especially if, as Ramsey himself notes, our society tends to
44. RAMSEY, PATIENT AS PERSON, supra note 17, at 11.
45. Ramsey, Children as Research Subjects, supra note 33, at 41.
46. See, e.g., In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796, 817 (S.D. Ohio
1995) (stating "individuals in our society are largely left free to pursue their own ends
without regard for others save a general duty not to harm others ... 
47. Ramsey, Children as Research Subjects, supra note 33, at 41.
48. See Ramsey, Some Rejoinders, supra note 33, at 185.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 230.
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view death as always a disaster and tries to avoid it through re-
search, medical care, and the like.51 "Tacit acceptance" of the ben-
efits of research could, and should, also be construed as entrance
into a community of "shared expectations" regarding the war
against diseases.
Ramsey's effort to distinguish conscripted (adult) research sub-
jects from conscripted soldiers ultimately depends on his interpre-
tation of legitimate "shared expectations," which in turn depends
on his evaluative description of research as optional for society be-
cause it promotes benefits, rather than preventing evil. He does
grant one "exception" (though he is not sure that it counts as an
"exception") that has a "remote analogy" with military service. 2
His example involves children, but extends to others who lack the
capacity to consent:
[T]he supposable case must be that these particular children are
going to be at risk of an illness of calamitous proportions in the
near future and if the cure or management of that illness beyond
doubt requires their use in medical research. Then they have a
precisely identifiable share in the common defense against ill-
ness, as soldiers do.53
However, if this example is plausible in Ramsey's framework, it
is not because of the analogy with war, but because this research
involving these particular children approximates therapeutic re-
search. The situation is one of "epidemic conditions that bring
upon the individual child proportionately the same or likely greater
dangers. 54
The late Hans Jonas, a philosopher, recognized the possibility of
conscription for experimentation when the society faced a "clear
and present danger," a health emergency, and could avert the dis-
aster only through conscription.5 5 This would be a situation of sav-
ing, not improving, the society.56 It is not clear whether Ramsey
ever recognized this sort of exception, because he tended to favor
51. Id.
52. Id. ("A remote analogy between the citizen-soldier and fetuses and children
has, I grant, some point. But only enough to be sufficient reason for a rare exception
to a general principle invalidating proxy consent to enter the uncomprehending sub-
jects in nontherapeutic research.").
53. Id. (citations omitted).
54. RAMSEY, PATIENT AS PERSON, supra note 17, at 25.
55. See generally Hans Jonas, Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting with
Human Subjects, in EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN SUBJECTs 1, 1-32 (Paul A.
Freund ed., 1969).
56. Id.
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qualifications of the meaning of moral rules rather than explicit
exceptions, and because he tended to view medical research almost
exclusively in terms of optional improvement for the future, i.e.,
what Jonas called a "melioristic goal."' 57 At any rate, if a situation
such as Jonas depicted came to exist, it could conceivably justify
conscription for research of more than minimal risk. However,
Ramsey worries that analogies between military conscription and
research conscription would in fact allow the society to impose
more than minimal risks in research when the goal seems to be of
"overriding importance to the public health. ' 58 For these reasons,
Ramsey appeared to be unwilling to concede an exception of emer-
gency or necessity regarding the public health.59
Nevertheless, a society may morally choose to undertake "man-
kind's war against diseases. ' 60 Holding that "the larger question of
medical and social priorities are almost, if not altogether, incorrigi-
ble to moral reasoning, "61 Ramsey allowed the society great lati-
tude in its priorities, for example, research vs. medical care,
prevention vs. rescue, or health care vs. other goods. But the soci-
ety's distribution of its benefits and its burdens is morally con-
strained. The burdens of research, at least of nontherapeutic
research, can morally be distributed only to those who voluntarily
agree to bear them. Whether the society undertakes a war against
disease is morally within its discretion, but how the society wages
that war is not morally optional. It is not permitted to use research
subjects against or without their will. This discussion is analogous
to Ramsey's treatment of jus ad bellum-the right to wage war-
and jus in bello-right conduct within war; indeed, the criteria of
just research are analogous to the criteria of just war.62
Since participation in research cannot be expected or demanded
of adults, it cannot be enforced, and it cannot be presumed of an
uncomprehending subject. Such "'construed' altruism '63 would be
violent even if the risks were low or minimal. Morally, the issue is
battery, not negligence. The "altruism" in question concerns the
57. Id. at 14.
58. Ramsey, Some Rejoinders, supra note 33, at 230.
59. Id.
60. Ramsey, Enforcement of Morals, supra note 33, at 29.
61. RAMSEY, PATIENT AS PERSON, supra note 17, at 240.
62. See PAUL RAMSEY, THE JUST WAR: FORCE AND POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY
142f (1968); see also JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRIORITIES IN BIOMEDICAL ETHICS, 51-74
(1981); LeRoy Walters, Some Ethical Issues in Research Involving Human Subjects,
20 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. 193, 193-211 (1977).
63. Ramsey, Some Rejoinders, supra note 33, at 228.
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integrity of one's body, rather than risks. Regarding the "burdens
of research," McCormick generally denies that low risk or minimal
risk research counts as a "burden," while Ramsey views "sacrifice"
as "any exaction without one's will," even if it would not be consid-
ered supererogatory or heroic if performed voluntarily. 64 The issue
is not merely one of charity or altruism in relation to bearing risks,
but rather the voluntariness of one's participation.65
Furthermore, if altruistic or charitable actions could be con-
strued or constructed for others, there would be no limit, no princi-
ple to constrain them, not even the standard of low or minimal risk.
Once consequentialist calculation is accepted, it tends to allow the
imposition of greater and greater risks. As Ramsey wrote, "I do
not see where one could rationally stop in construing all sorts of
works of mercy or self-sacrifice on the part of persons, not them-
selves capable by nature or grace yet of being the subjects of
charity." 66
Because research is optional for the society and for the individ-
ual, the researcher and the subject should be voluntary "joint ad-
venturers or partners in the enterprise of medical advancement. '67
This model of joint adventurership or partnership excludes the use
of subjects against their will (conscription of adults), or without
their will (the use of uncomprehending persons such as children or
persons with mental retardation or psychiatric disorders that affect
their decision-making capacity). This model of research participa-
tion also coheres with Ramsey's theology of covenantal relations,
and a conception of research and participation in research as mor-
ally optional.
Ramsey has both negative and positive arguments regarding the
importance of voluntary, informed consent (even though "volun-
tary" and "informed" are used interchangeably in this Essay, it is
fair to say, as noted above, that Ramsey emphasized voluntariness
rather than disclosure of information). 68 His negative argument re-
flects his substantive norms, as well as more general Protestant
64. See McCormick, Experimentation in Children, supra note 33, at 42.
65. Ramsey, Children as Research Subjects, supra note 33, at 42 n.8; Ramsey, En-
forcement of Morals, supra note 33, at 30 n.7.
66. Paul Ramsey, Medical Progress and Canons of Loyalty to Experimental Sub-
jects, in INST. FOR THEOLOGICAL ENCOUNTER WITH ScI. & TECH., BIOLOGICAL
REVOLUTION-THEOLOGICAL IMPACT 16 (1973), quoted in McCormick, Proxy Con-
sent, supra note 33.
67. RAMSEY, PATIENT AS PERSON, supra note 17, at 6.
68. See id. at ix, 1-58 (exploring "consent as a canon of loyalty with special refer-
ence to children in Medical Investigations.").
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convictions about human finitude and, especially, human sinful-
ness. Ramsey also used a political analogy to make this point
about theological anthropology. He quoted and then reformulated
Reinhold Niebuhr's famous epigram about democracy: "Man's ca-
pacity for justice makes democracy possible; man's propensity to
injustice makes democracy necessary."69 According to Ramsey's
reformulation: "Man's capacity to become joint adventurers in a
common cause [research] makes the consensual relation possible;
man's propensity to overreach his joint adventurer even in a good
cause makes consent necessary. "70 The consent of participants in
research is necessary in part, then, because researchers as finite
and sinful human beings may be tempted to exploit potential and
actual participants. Another political analogy also focused on the
consent requirement. Ramsey modified Abraham Lincoln's state-
ment, "no man is good enough to govern another without his con-
sent," to read "[n]o man is good enough to experiment upon
another without his consent. 71
One could take this line of argument even farther than Ramsey
did in the direction of procedures such as independent review, in-
dependent assessment of competence to consent to participation in
research, and avoidance of conflicts of interest. Ramsey certainly
recognized the dangers of conflicts of interest, for example, in his
insistence on the institutional separation of the roles of declaring
prospective donors of organs dead and of transplanting donated
organs into recipients.72
In addition to his negative argument, Ramsey developed a posi-
tive argument for the consent requirement in research. Ramsey's
positive argument is partly evident in his modification of Niebuhr's
quotation: "[m]an's capacity to become joint adventurers in a com-
mon cause," 73 specifically the cause of research. According to
Ramsey, as we have seen, research is an optional enterprise for the
society and for potential participants. 4 Their participation is a
matter of charitable action, not an obligation based on justice. Ide-
ally, the relation in research should be a "joint adventure," "joint
69. See id. at 5.
70. Id. at 5-6.
71. Id. at 7.
72. Id. at 101-12 (referring to the Harvard committee recommendation that "the
decision to declare the person dead, and then to turn off the respirator, be made by
physicians not involved in any later effort to transplant organs or tissue from the
deceased individual.").
73. Id. at 5-7.
74. Id. at 6.
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venture," "partnership," "cooperative enterprise," "voluntary asso-
ciation," "common enterprise of human medical progress," and, as
noted, a common cause. 5 This basically replicates Ramsey's cove-
nantal model, theologically construed. Participation in research
presupposes voluntary consent; research must be a "consensual
relation. "76
Ramsey's language fits well with the recent shift in language uti-
lized to address those involved in research. Earlier, they were
called "subjects" in research. While this language could distinguish
those persons involved in research from mere "objects," it also
identifies them as individuals who are subjected to research and
are, to some extent, under the control of researchers. Now the pre-
ferred language in many circles is "participant," rather than "sub-
ject. '7 7 Neither term is free of difficulties. "Participant" is terribly
broad as it fails to distinguish between the researchers and those
actually being studied. And it may represent an ideal that is not
met in all circumstances. For example, a child, or other person who
lacks sufficient mental capacity, may be enrolled in research, espe-
cially therapeutic research, by others. Does the child remain a
"subject," in the historical sense of the designation, or is the child
also a "participant," even though the participation is not volun-
tary? We have to ask such questions of all metaphors for the rela-
tionship between those who conduct research and those who are
studied-which metaphors most illuminate the relationship as it
exists and as it should exist?
Most of Ramsey's work appeared at a time when the major focus
of ethical analysis was upon nontherapeutic rather than therapeutic
research.78 To some extent, the requirements of justice have been
reinterpreted in modern bioethics as a result of a shift in the re-
search paradigm and, consequently, in the perceptions of injustice
in research.79 The earlier paradigm, prominent from the time of
75. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
76. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 15 (referring to
recipients of research treatment as 'participants' throughout).
78. The terms "nontherapeutic" and "therapeutic" are not fully adequate, but they
are used in this article to distinguish research that does not offer a reasonable pros-
pect of medical benefit to the participants ("nontherapeutic") from research that does
offer a chance of medical benefit to the participant ("therapeutic").
79. See Harold Y. Vanderpool, Introduction and Overview: Ethics, Historical Case
Studies, and the Research Enterprise, in THE ETHICS OF RESEARCH INVOLVING
HUMAN SUBJECTS FACING THE 21ST CENTURY 1, 4-14 (1996) (outlining the develop-
mental history of medical ethics from the time of Nazi experimentation on wartime
prisoners through the experiments in Tuskegee, Alabama and into the 1990's).
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Nuremberg, focused on the risks and burdens of research and on
the need to protect potential and actual research subjects from
harm, abuse, exploitation, and the like.8° Ethical guidelines for this
paradigm emphasize voluntary, informed consent-that is where
the Nuremberg Code begins.8
According to Carol Levine, our basic approach to regulating re-
search in the United States "was born in scandal and reared in pro-
tectionism. '8 2 The dominant model in protectionist policies is non-
therapeutic research, i.e., research that does not offer the possibil-
ity of therapeutic benefit to the subject, and that is the model Ram-
sey emphasized.8 3 In the paradigm shift, however, attention turned
from nontherapeutic to therapeutic research (for example, clinical
trials of promising new therapeutic agents), from protection to ac-
cess, and from risks and burdens to possible benefits of research. s4
This shift resulted particularly (but not exclusively) from the epi-
demic of HIV infection and AIDS.8
This inclusionist paradigm is important. However, we should not
totally abandon the protectionist paradigm. The hard ethical task
is to combine the valuable components of both models in order to
protect subjects' or participants' rights and welfare in light of a
principle of justice-or, for Ramsey, "love-transformed-justice"-
that now rejects unjust exclusion as well as exploitation, because
vulnerable populations may be threatened by non-inclusion as well
as by inclusion.
As a further extension, Ramsey's model of love and justice in
covenantal relations in research provides a strong foundation for
compensation for research related-injuries, as an expression of the
community's solidarity with those who suffer injuries in research
after assuming a position of risk on behalf of the community. One
plausible interpretation of Ramsey's framework is that such com-
pensation is justified as a matter of justice-love-transformed jus-
tice-not merely discretionary beneficence or charity. From this
standpoint, it is not enough to disclose on the consent form
whether there will be any compensation for research-related inju-
80. Carol Levine, Changing Views of Justice after Belmont. AIDS and the Inclusion
of 'Vulnerable' Subjects, in THE ETHICS OF RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS
FACING THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 79, at 105-06.
81. James F. Childress, Nuremberg's Legacy: Some Ethical Reflections, 43 PERSP.
BIOLOGY & MED. 347, 347-61 (2000).
82. Levine, supra note 80, at 105-06.
83. See RAMSEY, PATIENT AS PERSON, supra note 17, at 12.
84. See Levine, supra note 80, at 107.
85. See id. at 107-10.
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ries that are non-negligently caused; instead, compensation should
be provided.
In conclusion, the norms of love and justice reverberate through-
out Ramsey's work (and his extended debate with McCormick) on
nontherapeutic research involving children who cannot consent
(thougi I have also considered subjects who may be older, but lack
the full capacity to consent, as well as those competent persons
who refuse to consent). In the context of this debate, McCormick
tends to stress the distinction between charity and justice in deter-
mining what we can minimally expect and demand of others, even
to the extent of exacting it against or without their will.86 Ramsey
also accepts, but tends to downplay that distinction, emphasizing
instead what both love (as covenant-faithfulness) and justice (or
love-transformed-justice) require of the society, professionals, and
family members when they confront potential research participants
who lack the capacity to consent or refuse to participate. 87 He em-
phasizes God's care for the weak and the vulnerable and explicates
what this implies for our care for such individuals. 88 Human agape
shaped by divine agape requires expression in rules of consent in
nontherapeutic research, itself an optional endeavor for both the
society and its members. These rules represent historical deposits
of neighbor-love, under the influence of the Judeo-Christian
tradition.
Finally, although Ramsey's emphasis on consent has affinities
with the Kantian tradition of respect for persons, as he admits, his
explicit grounds are Christian.89 Specifically, in relation to the use
of children in nontherapeutic research, Ramsey appeals not to the
Kantian conception of humanity, but instead to God's agape: "the
wholeness of God's care for the least and the littlest ones and their
preciousness to Him." 90
Ramsey's theology and ethics, as extended to requirements of
informed consent in research, represent a major and formidable
position. Even though it is not without its problems and deficien-
cies, some of which I have noted in passing, it continues to merit
attention and debate as a rigorous interpretation of fundamental
Protestant theological beliefs in the context of bioethics. Ramsey
insisted that his appeal to Christian beliefs did not finally limit the
86. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
89. See Ramsey, Enforcement of Morals, supra note 33, at 26.
90. See id. at 30 n.19.
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audience for his arguments because so many of those beliefs have
become embedded in the norms that govern medicine and re-
search. Hence, both believers and non-believers could appreciate
and engage his arguments.
sI1 
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